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I. INTRODUCTION
The growing concern over the fate of children in foster care is
one recent manifestation of this country's continuing interest in the
welfare of its children. The rise in the number of children in
"temporary" foster placements from 287,000 in 1965' to an esti-
mated 364,000 in 1975 reflects increased protective service activity
resulting in the removal of children from the parental home. Yet the
continuing concept of foster care as a temporary placement prior to
the child's returning home or being adopted is an idealized and
outdated view of the system, for foster care is often many years in
duration.
The present alternatives for placements after years of foster
care are limited-foster children may be returned to parental cus-
tody, they may be adopted, or they may continue under foster care.
Except in the unusual situation in which parents maintain contact
with a child over many years and then resume custody, a child gains
permanent and secure placement only through adoption. There is
reason to question, however, whether absolute termination of the
natural parents' rights and subsequent adoption constitute the opti-
mal alternative for all children after long-term foster care.
This Article will explore in detail the variety of child placement
arrangements, both within and outside the system, which can be
tailored to meet the needs of children and their biological or foster
parents. This examination will reveal numerous statutory reforms
and recent judicial decisions that promise increasingly flexible ap-
proaches to the traditional custodial alternatives following long-
term foster care. Particular emphasis will be devoted to the termi-
nation of parental rights case that first united the authors and con-
fronted them with the fact that none of the traditional legal alterna-
tives available to those children could adequately meet their emo-
tional needs.
1. Katz, Legal Aspects of Foster Care, 5 F m. L.Q. 283 (1971).
2. Geiser, The Shuffled Child and Foster Care, 10 TRIAL 27 (May/June 1974).
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II. FOSTER CARE AND CONTINUITY OF RELATIONSHIPS
A. The Traditional Status of Foster Parents
Foster parents traditionally are considered employees of the
agency with which they contract, with numerous duties and few
rights.3 When a foster parent attempts to contest removal of a child
by the responsible welfare agency, or attempts to adopt a child
against agency wishes, courts typically uphold the broad rights of
biological parents and emphasize the limited nature of the place-
ment contract between the foster parents and the agency.4 Formula-
tion of placement plans for the child, including plans for adoption,
is left to the agency. 5
The rationale for the traditional concept of the rights of foster
parents vis-a-vis natural parents was articulated in In re Jewish
Child Care Association.6 Foster parents in that case appealed the
lower court decision permitting a child care agency to remove from
their custody a five and one-half year-old child who had spent four
and one-half years in their care. The foster parents had accepted the
girl under a standard agency agreement that the placement would
be temporary and that the foster parents would prepare her for
return to her biological mother. Before the first year ended, how-
ever, the foster parents decided to adopt the girl and actively pur-
sued that course in direct conflict with agency rules and policies.
The foster parents lost their battle to keep the child. In what Katz7
sees as a subversion of the child's best interests, the court of appeals
decided in favor of the agency, faulting the "extreme of love, affec-
tion, and possessiveness manifested by the [foster parents], togther
[sic] with the conduct which their emotional involvement im-
pelled."8
3. Katz, supra note 1, at 283-302.
4. Note, The Rights of Foster Parents to the Children in Their Care, 50 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 86-102 (1973). In one representative situation the biological mother sought custody of
her child, who had been with his foster parents from the age of three months to five years.
The foster parents in turn attempted to terminate the mother's rights and to adopt the child.
The court found that the foster parents "were bound by their agreement with the Department
of Public Welfare" and that the "Department . . . was entitled to the possession of the
child." Huey v. Lente, 85 N.M. 585, 591-92, 514 P.2d 1081, 1087-88 (1973). Thus the foster
parents were accorded no legal standing, and custody was granted to the biological mother.
5. For instance, in In re Adoption of Runyon, 268 Cal. App. 2d 918, 74 Cal. Rptr. 514
(1969), a boy who had been with foster parents since the age of three days was removed from
their home at the age of eight and placed with prospective adoptive parents. Although the
foster parents also filed a petition for adoption, they were unable even to obtain a hearing on
their petition. The court upheld the absolute statutory right of the agency to choose adoptive
parents, and removal of the child was final.
6. 5 N.Y.2d 222, 156 N.E.2d 700, 183 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959).
7.' Katz, supra note 1, at 296.
8. Id. at 294.
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This decision reflects a common judicial impression of foster
care, in which the contractual view of foster care persists. A New
York court recently disparaged the idea of a foster parent's right to
custody as a notion by which "third-party custodians . . . acquire
some sort of squatter's rights in another's child."9 In an earlier deci-
sion, the same court admonished that "the temporary parent substi-
tute must keep his proper distance at all costs to himself."'" By
tradition, then, foster care is defined as providing merely
"substitute family care for a planned period for a child when his own
family cannot care for him for a temporary or extended period, and
when adoption is neither desirable nor possible."" Nevertheless, the
assumption that foster care involves only temporary placement is
not always correct.
B. Duration of Foster Care Placements
The results of studies conducted in the last twenty years rebut
the presumption that foster placements are uniformly short in dura-
tion.1 2 In Maas and Engler's classic 1959 study' 3 involving over 4000
children the authors demonstrated that more than half would re-
main in foster care for most of their childhoods. A 1973 Massachu-
9. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 552 n.2, 356 N.E.2d 277, 285 n.2, 387 N.Y.S.2d
821, 829 n.2 (1976). See also Organization of Foster Families v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277,
281 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (three-judge court), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Smith v. Organiza-
tion of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (Foster parents do not have a constitutional
expectation that their roles "will not be abruptly and summarily terminated."); Spence-
Chapin Adoption Serv. v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196, 205, 274 N.E.2d 431, 436, 324 N.Y.S.2d 937,
945 (1971) ("To the ordinary fears in placing a child in foster care should not be added the
concern that the better the foster care custodians the greater the risk that they will assert,
out of love and affection grown too deep, an inchoate right to adopt."). But see Drummond
v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 547 F.2d 835, 853, 855 (5th Cir.), rev'd
on rehearing en banc, 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977); In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 692-93, 523
P.2d 244, 253-54, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444, 453-54 (1974) (Foster parents, as de facto parents, are
proper parties in a juvenile court review of foster placement and may "assert and protect their
own interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of the child.").
10. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv. v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196, 205, 274 N.E.2d 431, 436,
324 N.Y.S.2d 937, 945 (1971).
11. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMEmCA, STANDARDS FOR FOSTER FAMILY CARE SERVIcE 5
(1959). One must suspend disbelief while reading these standards because of the superhuman
qualities they require of the model foster parent. Not only should such a person (1) love his
or her foster child, (2) enjoy being a foster parent and (3) be able to maintain friction-free
relationships with all people, but he or she should also "have the ability to accept the child's
relationship with his parents and with the agency, without marked tendency to be overposses-
sive." Id., standard 4.4 at 35.
12. This fact is well-recognized in the literature. See, e.g., Wald, State Intervention on
Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes,
Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28
STAN. L. REv. 625, 626 & n.7, 627 n.8 (1976).
13. H. MAAS & R. ENGLER, CHILDREN IN NEED OF PARENTS (1959).
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setts study revealed that the sixty percent of the children in care at
the time of the study had been in care between four and eight years;
the average stay was over five years. 4 In the Columbia University
longitudinal study of children in foster care in New York City, 15
thirty-six percent remained in foster care at the end of five years."
About two-thirds of the children who had remained in care for five
years had lost contact with their parents, and forty-six percent of
the children remaining in care five years had experienced three or
more placements. 17 Thus a great gulf exists between the myth that
foster care readily terminates in return home or in adoption, and the
reality that for many children foster care is interminable and may
involve a significant number of placements.
C. Judicial Recognition of the Foster Child-Foster Parent
Relationship
The emotional bonds that develop between foster parents and
foster children often are indistinguishable from those existing be-
tween natural parents and their children. Because neither children
nor foster parents have been parties to termination disputes, how-
ever, traditionally the courts have rarely recognized the emotional
needs of foster children. Several recent cases, on the other hand,
evidence a new trend in the legal status of foster parents. In James
v. McLinden, i1 for example, a three month-old daughter of a heroin
addict was placed with a forty-seven year-old woman who desired
to raise the child. When the child was two years old, the welfare
department filed a petition of neglect stating that the child had
been abandoned by her parents and "is presently being cared for
through an informal arrangement which is neither legal nor
healthy."'" The juvenile judge did not deem the mothering person
a legal party to the proceeding and denied her entrance to the
hearing. On application for injunction and declarative relief, how-
ever, the district court held that the woman's due process and equal
protection rights had been violated, reasoning that:
14. A. GRUBER, FOSTER HOME CARE IN MASSACHUSETTS 72 (1973) (copy on file with the
Vanderbilt Law Review).
15. S. JENKINS & M. NORMAN, BEYOND PLACEMENT: MOTHERS VIEW FOSTER CARE (1975).
This study provided information concerning 624 children from 467 families with children in
foster care. The children were under twelve years of age at first entry into foster care.
16. Fanshel, Status Changes of Children in Foster Care: Final Results of the Columbia
University Longitudinal Study, 55 CHILD WELFARE 143, 145 (1976).
17. Fanshel, Parental Visiting of Children in Foster Care: Key to Discharge?, 49 Soc.
SERVICE REV. 493, 496 (1975).
18. 341 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Conn. 1969).
19. Id. at 1234.
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There is no sound reason to deny a person who has voluntarily assumed the
obligations of parenthood over a child the same basic rights to due process a
natural or legal parent possesses when the state intervenes to disrupt or destroy
the family unit. "The policy of our law has always been to encourage family
relationships, even those foster in character."'
Thus the court clearly recognized the bond that had developed be-
tween a non-biological parent and a child in her care.
In a second case2' a relatively inexperienced agency worker de-
termined that the atmosphere in a certain foster home was detri-
mental to a child who had lived there from the age of three weeks
to nine years. At the request of the worker, the agency removed the
child from the home. The lower court denied the foster parents'
request for continued custody, but the appellate court upheld the
rights of the foster parents and reversed the decision. The court
noted that custody determinations should focus on the child's best
interests rather than the rights of the placement organization. In
this case the court deemed the effect of separating the child and his
foster parents to be devastating.
A similar case2 2 involved a five year-old boy who spent four
years with a foster family. The child care agency ordered return of
the child to the biological parents, and the lower court upheld this
decision. On appeal, the reviewing court determined that despite
the limited rights granted by the contract under which they cared
for the child, the foster parents, as the de facto parents for four
years, had the legal standing to file a petition raising the custody
issue. The contract they had signed with the child care service was,
therefore, held unenforceable. Despite the evidence that a greater
concern regarding the needs and rights of children and their foster
parents exists in today's courts, the current legal status of foster
parents remains ambiguous.
D. The Current Ambiguous Status of Foster Parents
For some time foster parents and foster parent organizations
have been seeking a greater part in decisionmaking regarding chil-
dren in their care.n Even when foster placement is of long duration
and the level of the child's contact with biological parents is low,
20. Id. at 1235.
21. Commonwealth v. Children's Servs., 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 556, 307 A.2d 411 (1973).
22. Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Serv., 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 371, 324 A.2d
562 (1974). For a discussion of this case, see Note, Increasing the Rights of Foster Parents,
36 U. PITt. L. REV. 715, 718-24 (1975).
23. See also Reistroffer, Participation of Foster Parents in Decision Making: The Con-




the status of the foster parent remains unclear. In 1977 the United
States Supreme Court struck a blow to the rights of foster parents
by upholding a New York statute authorizing removal of the child
from the foster home without a prior full adversary administrative
hearing." The district court25 had invalidated that provision of the
statute on due process grounds, but the Supreme Court found only
a limited liberty interest at stake and held that the established
procedures were sufficient to protect those limited interests. Em-
phasizing that the relief sought in this case was purely procedural,
the Court distinguished this case from those recognizing a right to
family privacy in that "the State here seeks to interfere, not with a
relationship having its origins entirely apart from the power of the
State, but rather with a foster family which has its source in State
law and contractual arrangements. ' 26 A concurring opinion dis-
missed the foster family's interest with even greater ease, stating
that "[tihe family life upon which the State 'intrudes' is simply a
temporary status which the State itself has created."27 Clearly,
then, conflict still exists between the emotional ties developed in a
foster care situation and the long-established theories of the rights
of natural parents.
E. The Child's Needs and the Law of Child Custody After Long-
Term Foster Care
The superior custody claim of a natural parent over a third
party is ingrained in our cultural and legal tradition. The claim of
the natural parent is supported by two doctrines which frequently
are mutually reinforcing. The "parental right" doctrine holds that
the natural parent has the right to custody in the absence of de-
monstrable detriment to the child.2 8 The "best interests of the
child" doctrine purports to give courts great latitude in determining
placements. In reality, however, it often complements the "parental
right" doctrine because judges assume that the best interests of the
child are met when he or she is in the custody of the natural parent.29
24. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). The Court considered
emotional issues in its determination that there was no liberty interest at stake.
25. Organization of Foster Families v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(three-judge court).
26. 431 U.S. at 845.
27. Id. at 863 (Stewart, J., concurring).
28. For a general discussion of the evolution of the parental right doctrine, see Leavell,
Custody Disputes and the Proposed Model Act, 2 GA. L. REv. 162, 165-78 (1968). American
courts never accepted the harsh common law concept that gave a father almost unlimited
right to custody. Nevertheless, until recently, courts have used property concepts in deter-
mining custody disputes. Id. at 166.
29. Id. at 166, 178-81. See note 28 supra. For a summary of the disposition standards
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For many children the limited and rigid custodial alternatives
available after long-term foster care constitute an important part of
the problem afflicting the foster care system. When the child cannot
return to the biological parents' home, the standard options are
either continued foster care or adoption, the latter alternative re-
quiring termination of biological parents' rights regarding their chil-
dren. No custodial question is more difficult than termination of
parental rights, since the law also must serve parental interests.
Termination is fraught with judicial resistance because of its abso-
luteness: parental rights are either sustained or severed." This deci-
sion vexes judges. Also, it is unclear whether the child's interests
might not sometimes better be served by a custody arrangement
short of absolute severance. Providing children a permanent place-
ment with adults who have a long-term commitment to them, as
well as making possible some continuity with biological parents,
optimally might meet the needs of some children.
In termination actions courts too often find that the parents'
behavior or disabilities do not warrant absolute termination, but
that the child's welfare requires continued foster care. 3' Although in
many such cases it is unlikely that the parents will resume adequate
parenting roles, the tradition of parental custody rights is so strong
that these rights tend to prevail in any doubtful situation. Thus,
courts face a recurring impasse that results in the often unsatisfac-
tory compromise solution of continued foster care.
Decisions to intervene in children's lives are difficult to make
because they involve value judgments as well as complicated legal,
emotional, and practical issues. The morass of conflicting and often
indeterminate interests is reflected in the definition of the best in-
terest standard as "an empty vessel into which adult perceptions
and prejudices are poured. 3 -2 A 1971 Oregon case seeking termina-
prescribed by various state laws, see Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Func-
tions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 226 (1976). This Article does not
attempt to address the differences in standards for termination of parental rights or the issues
addressed at a termination hearing. For such a discussion, see Wald, supra note 12.
30. See generally Derdeyn & Wadlington, Adoption: The Rights of Parents Versus the
Best Interests of Their Children, 16 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCH. 238 (1977). For a concise
bibliography on the termination question, see Levine, Foundations for Drafting a Model
Statute to Terminate Parental Rights: A Selected Bibliography, 26 Juv. JUST. 42, 46-56 (Aug.
1975). For a summary of state termination laws, see Katz, Howe, & McGrath, Child Neglect
Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1, 73-362 (1975). See also Areen, Intervention Between Parent
and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEo. L.
J. 887, 928-30 (1975).
31. See generally Derdeyn, A Case for Permanent Foster Placement of Dependent,
Neglected, and Abused Children, 47 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 604 (1977).
32. Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARv. EDuc. REv. 487, 513 (1973).
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tion of rights of neglectful parents provides a good example of the
ethical and legal quagmire such cases may entail. In State v.
McMaster"3 the child had been placed with foster parents at age two
months. The foster parents later wished to adopt, and when the
child turned four the lower court effected termination of parental
rights preparatory to adoption. The biological parents appealed.
The Oregon Supreme Court noted that "the parents frequently
quarrelled, [the biological father] never held a job more than a
month and seldom that long, they were usually on welfare, and [the
father] frequently left home with the welfare check, leaving [the
biological mother] destitute."34 Testimony suggested that the bio-
logical parents "would not allow [the] child to maximize her poten-
tial."35 Yet the court was unwilling to terminate parental rights
because this family's situation was not unusual enough to warrant
such a drastic step:
[T]he state of the [biological] family is duplicated in hundreds of thousands
of American families,-transiency and incapacity, poverty and instability
* .*. . However, we do not believe the legislature contemplated that parental
rights could be terminated because the natural parents are unable to furnish
surroundings which would enable the child to grow up as we would desire all
children to do .... The best interests of the child are paramount; however,
the courts cannot sever. . . parental rights when many thousands of children
are being raised under basically the same circumstances as this child."
The court invalidated the termination but did not require transfer
of custody to the biological parent. Thus the parental disabilities
appeared to have justified the child's placement in foster care, but
were not sufficient to warrant termination of parental rights. This
impasse-judicial affirmation of parental rights coupled with judi-
cial admission that the welfare of children may warrant custody in
a foster parent-is one which significantly impairs the lives of thou-
sands of children in foster care.
The termination issue creates substantial obstacles to proper
attention to the needs of some children.37 The either-or approach to
termination results in inconsistent judicial decisions on similar sets
of facts. In one illustrative case three siblings ranging in age from
five to nine had spent three and one-half years in numerous, sepa-
33. 259 Or. 291, 486 P.2d 567 (1971).
34. Id. at 302, 486 P.2d at 572.
35. Id. at 303, 486 P.2d at 572.
36. Id. at 303-04, 486 P.2d at 572-73.
37. For the foremost legal and psychoanalytical theories in the field of child placement,
see J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973).
These authors advocate legal recognition of the premise that the healthy development of each
child requires continuity of the relationship with the adult who cares for him and meets his
emotional and psychological needs. Id. at 31-32.
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rate foster care placements. Their mother's whereabouts were un-
known, and the welfare department petitioned to terminate the
rights of the children's father. The court conceded the father's ina-
bility to establish an economically and emotionally stable home for
the children. The decision was complicated, however, by the fact
that the father periodically had demonstrated interest in the chil-
dren; the oldest child, in fact, wished to remain with the father.
Ultimately the court denied termination and adoption-attention
to the children's emotional attachments and the father's legal rights
precluded the children's securing of permanent homes.
3
1
Reaching the opposite conclusion, however, does not always
solve the problems of the child. In another case a child's need for
stability and permanence was recognized and met at the cost to the
child of a continuing relationship with a biological parent .3 The
parental rights of the mother of a six year-old girl were terminated
when the court found the child to be permanently neglected. As the
dissent pointed out, however, the mother displayed no intention of
abandoning her child; she had, in fact, visited her regularly twice a
month. The dissent observed that the mother had a "generally inad-
equate and defeatist attitude towards life," suffered a deeply in-
grained "generalized lassitude," and noted that "any change of life
style [was] fraught with fears and tension."40 Notwithstanding
these factors, he was reluctant to terminate the mother's rights
because she might be helped to function at such a level that she
could regain custody of her child. Facts in the record made it appear
unlikely that the mother would become able to care for the child.
Given this child's age and her mother's demonstrated interest, how-
ever, one can assume that the relationship with her mother was of
considerable importance to the child. Severance of such a relation-
ship is not likely to be the best alternative for the child's develop-
ment. In this case, attention to the child's need for a permanent
home with a capable parent outweighed the normally superior cus-
todial right of the biological mother to retain custody.
The circumstances of children of divorced parents and foster
children often are analogous. Children from disrupted families tend
to develop their own immature and primitive fantasies about the
cause of the disruption.' Following parental separation, death of a
parent, or removal from the parental home, the child almost invari-
38. State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Crabtree, 23 Or. App. 183, 541 P.2d 1311 (1975).
39. In re "Female" B., 49 A.D.2d 615, 370 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
40. Id. at 615, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
41. Derdeyn, Children in Divorce: Intervention in the Phase of Separation, 60
PEDIATRICS 20, 21-22 (1977).
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ably entertains distorted fantasies of the absent parent. In these
situations, as well, visits with non-custodial parents may be of great
benefit. Authors addressing the value of contact with the non-
custodial divorced parent have written that
visitation precludes the need for nurturing any unwholesome and energy-
consuming obsession with establishing a rendezvous with the non-custodial
parent and provides an avenue by which the child can test the reality of images
which are a product of his own fantasies and the impressions of others that
have been communicated to him.1
2
Following long-term foster care, then, adoption is not always
the most constructive legal or emotional alternative. The absolute-
ness of adoption makes it difficult for judges to justify terminating
parental rights, and decisions which could lead to permanent place-
ments are thus precluded. The either-or characteristic of adoption
also may not be in the best interest of children who will benefit from
maintaining contact with their past. Permanent and secure arrange-
ments other than traditional adoption can and should be made for
these children. Some courts and legislatures have begun addressing
this need for alternative placement arrangements.
I. CASE REPORT
A case involving the termination of rights of the parents of two
siblings in foster care brought the authors together and confronted
them with the fact that none of the usual legal alternatives available
to these children adequately met their emotional needs. The two
children involved were Julie and Tom Jennings, twelve and ten
years of age, respectively. The local welfare department removed
them from their home because their parents neglected them se-
verely. The father's alcoholism and the mother's limited ability to
cope with family crises had led to a long history of Jennings family
chaos, often the subject of welfare department intervention in the
years prior to the removal of the children. They spent twenty-two
months in the home of Mr. and Mrs. Wallace, who had two children
of the Jennings children's approximate ages.
In this twenty-two month period, during which Mr. and Mrs.
Jennings visited their children three times, the family court held
numerous hearings in connection with the welfare department's pe-
titions for permanent custody of the children. The court initially
accepted the arguments for delay which were based on psychiatric
testimony concerning the perceived needs of the parents for emo-
42. Benedek & Benedek, Postdivorce Visitation: A Child's Right, 16 J. AM. AcAD. CHILD
PSYCH. 256, 261-62 (1977).
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tional and vocational counseling, and for time to arrange employ-
ment and adequate housing. As it became apparent that the parents
were unable so to utilize the time granted and that the children were
suffering from their status of uncertainty, the court denied motions
for further extensions. Recognizing the presence of conflicting inter-
ests between the children's need for stable relationships with their
adult caretakers and their parents' need for an opportunity to reor-
der their lives before being faced with the irreversible loss of their
children, the court asked one of the authors to consult regarding
final disposition of the children.
Julie and Tom Jennings, Mr. and Mrs. Wallace, and the Wal-
lace children were interviewed by the psychiatric consultant. Julie
and Tom were told that the purpose of the meeting was for the
consultant to help the judge determine what decision would be best
for them. Excerpts of the report to the court follow.
A. Report of Psychiatric Consultation
(1) Findings
Julie and Tom Jennings felt accepted and comfortable in the
Wallace home and enjoyed comfortable relationships with the Wal-
lace children. Both children volunteered examples of their biological
parents' inadequate provision of basic needs (food and necessary
medical care). They explained how different and how nice it was for
the Wallaces to do such things as go to school to find out about their
progress. Julie also mentioned that they could talk about any prob-
lem, regardless of its nature, with the Wallaces, unlike the situation
with their biological parents.
In spite of their positive feelings about Mr. and Mrs. Wallace,
however, both children also wished to return home. Tom simply
wanted to return to his parents' home and could give no specific
reason for his desire. Julie, more realistic than Tom about the prob-
lem, felt that her father had to stop drinking before this would be
possible. They expressed concern about their parents and felt that
returning to them would somehow make things better. Both chil-
dren were aware of the Wallaces' concern for them, a concern they
did not sense was manifested by their biological parents. Paradoxi-
cally, the children showed a protective concern for their biological
parents and felt they should be home taking care of their biological
parents.
Both children, when seen separately and asked to draw a pic-
ture of their family, drew idealized scenes. Julie seated the entire
family at a meal and Tom drew the family playing baseball to-
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gether. Tom drew his mother with a very sad face, saying it was
because she did not see her children. He also expressed feelings of
inadequacy by picturing himself with a baseball bat containing a
hole so that the ball might pass through the bat even if he swung
correctly. Tom felt that he should be back with his mother in order
to make her feel better. Julie, a bit older, had the same feelings but
believed that she had a better chance in life with the Wallaces. Both
of these children felt guilty and responsible for their absence and,
most directly, for making their mother sad. The obvious equation
in their minds was that if they were to return to their parents, they
would no longer have to feel guilty.
Notwithstanding the passage of twenty-two months, the ar-
rangement presumably was temporary, and the children had always
expected that they would return home. They clung to this hope
because, from their point of view, there was no alternative to the
current, "temporary" situation.
In terms of emotional realities, the children viewed their rela-
tionship with Mr. and Mrs. Wallace in a way approaching that of a
parent-child relationship, muted somewhat by everyone's realiza-
tion that this was supposed to be a temporary arrangement. The
Wallaces were not financially able to adopt these children, although
their attachment was strong, and they wished to continue to care
for the children.
Julie and Tom felt cared for by Mr. and Mrs. Wallace, and they
felt themselves to be, in essence, part of the Wallace family. At a
fantasy level they expected that a return to their parents would
provide some emotional relief, and therefore they wished to return
home. The layman would find it unusual to see children of this age
(ten and twelve years) invest so heavily in fantasy (reunion with
biological parents) to the relative exclusion of reality (current loving
relationship with the Wallaces).
(2) Recommendation
The optimal situation for these children was continued care by
Mr. and Mrs. Wallace under a permanent arrangement. These
children would benefit from the knowledge that their home with
the Wallaces was secure, so that both they and the Wallaces no
longer would be limited in their relationships by their temporary
state. The children, because of their feelings about their biological
parents, should have the possibility of continuing contact with
them. This was acceptable to Mr. and Mrs. Wallace.
The usual alternatives-(1) termination of parental rights with
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consequent availability for adoption, (2) continued foster care under
the current arrangement, and (3) return to the custody of Mr. and
Mrs. Jennings-had important shortcomings, since none of them
matched the emotional realities of Julie and Tom Jennings' lives.
Termination might offer Julie and Tom stability and continuity,
assuming the Wallaces' ability to adopt. Because adoption did not
appear possible, however, termination of parental rights introduced
the possibility of an unacceptable eventuality-adoption by strang-
ers. This would disrupt the relationship with the Wallaces and pos-
sibly separate the children from each other. Continued foster care
also was unacceptable. The temporary nature of their current status
impeded both the children and the Wallaces, in spite of a very
successful relationship, in their commitments to each other. These
children required a definitive resolution of their custody to help
them invest more in current living and less in fantasy. The third
alternative, return to the custody of the biological parents, was
unacceptable also, because of the inability of the parents ade-
quately to assume their parenting responsibilities. The wishes for
family reunion were basically neurotic in character, and the chil-
dren would not find the sought-for emotional relief by returning to
their biological parents. They would, in fact, feel extremely anxious
and unsupported if placed with their biological parents, and would
suffer the loss of the only realistic parent-child relationship current
in their lives.
The optimal resolution of this issue involved a truly permanent
arrangement allowing these children to stay with the Wallaces. Re-
gardless of whether Mr. and Mrs. Jennings' parental rights were
formally terminated, a permanent settlement was needed which
would cut off their access to the courts to intervene in the lives of
these children, while still allowing the children to have contact with
Mr. and Mrs. Jennings at the discretion of Mr. and Mrs. Wallace.
The "temporary" nature of foster care was itself detrimental to
these children at this time. They remained unsettled because of the
temporary situation and very anxious regarding the upcoming trial.
They required a final resolution of the current situation to free them
from excessive involvement with the past and unrealistic hopes for
the future.
B. The Decision
The court did not adhere to the usual legal alternatives, but
accepted instead the consultant's advice. Parental rights were ter-
minated, the children remained in foster care with the Wallaces,
and provision was made for the welfare department to arrange visits
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by the children with their biological parents at Mr. and Mrs. Wal-
lace's request.
C. Follow-Up One Year Later
A year after the decision, the Wallaces had almost completed
the process of subsidized adoption. Julie, then thirteen, wished to
take the Wallace name but was concerned about her biological par-
ents' possible anger. Tom, then eleven, had less enthusiasm for the
adoption and wished to retain the Jennings name, which was agree-
able to the Wallaces. The children had visited once with their
mother, and Julie had a fairly active correspondence with her. Tom
was writing his mother occasionally at the urging of his sister. The
Wallaces continued to allow the children to visit their biological
parents whenever they wished to do so. Julie spoke much more
openly of her biological parents than did Tom, and was getting
along very well academically and with peers. Although Julie felt
duty and affection toward her biological parents, she had made firm
attachments to the Wallace family and to her life with them. Tom
remained overinvolved with the past, failing to make an optimum
investment in his current life. Psychiatric intervention still was a
possibility to help him modify his apparent feelings of guilt regard-
ing his biological parents.
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF CHILD PLACEMENT
Critics of indeterminate decisionmaking standards often desire
to shift back to the legislature the responsibility for formulating
more definite criteria upon which judges may base their decisions.43
On the other hand, the tradition of wide judicial discretion in com-
plex custody determinations is still viable to some, including one
judge who expressed her reservations about judicial determination
this way: "[T]here can be no single or final definition that will
encompass the myriad variations in the social histories, parental
attitudes or actions, the conditions of the parents and the life pros-
pects for the child."4 Governmental branches are responding to the
increasing recognition of the limitations imposed by the conven-
tional options for placement of children after long-term foster care.
State legislatures are considering new statutory schemes designed
to give greater flexibility of choice. Courts, faced with the frustra-
43. See generally Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest?, 43 Hv. EDUC. REV.
599 (1973); Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realis-
tic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985 (1975).
44. In re P., 71 Misc. 2d 965, 969, 337 N.Y.S.2d 203, 208 (Fam. Ct. 1972).
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tion of day-to-day family crises, have fashioned their own place-
ments, as did the court in our case study. Additionally, commenta-
tors concerned with the limited nature of traditional child place-
ments have suggested other alternatives, some of which may be
implemented within existing statutory schemes.
A. Legislative Developments
(1) Legislative Encouragement of Adoption
The number of children available for adoption has decreased
substantially in recent years. 5 Increasing acceptance of single par-
enthood, growing awareness of birth control methods, and the avail-
ability of medically safe and legally sanctioned abortions" contrib-
ute to this reduction. Increasingly, those available for adoption are
older and minority children, both of whom are less readily adopted.
In addition, some children tend to remain in foster care as a result
of physical, medical, or emotional handicaps. 7
Many states" have enacted subsidized adoption laws which
provide financial assistance for expenses borne by people willing to
adopt hard-to-place children. 9 These statutes
provide a subsidy for a child when prospective adoptive parents are unable to
assume full financial responsibility for the child during his minority. The
subsidy would help with the costs of special medical care and with additional
expenses incurred because of a child's continuing disabilities; facilitate adop-
tion by many minority group families; minimize the special economic drain
of rearing several children from the same biological family who should remain
together.0
Subsidized adoption offers considerable potential for many children
presently suffering from the indefiniteness of foster care. So far,
however, it has not been widely exploited. 5' In an attempt to breathe
45. Derdeyn, Adoption in Evolution: Recent Influences on Adoption in Virginia, 70 S.
MED. J. 168 (1977).
46. Contra, Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (Court held that there is no constitu-
tional requirement that public funds be used to finance abortions for indigent women).
47. Derdeyn, supra note 45, at 169.
48. Over forty jurisdictions now have subsidized adoption statutes, Katz & Gallagher,
Subsidized Adoption in America, 10 FAm. L.Q. 3, 7 (1976).
49. Watson, Subsidized Adoptions: A Crucial Investment, 51 CHILD WELFARE 220, 224
(1972).
50. Katz & Gallagher, supra note 48, at 4. One study found the costs of continued foster
care and attendant administrative expenses to be less than the costs of subsidies to an
adopting family. CmLD CARE AssoCIATION OF ILUNOIS, SuBsmIzED ADOPTION: A STUDY OF USE
AND NEED IN FouR AGENCIES (1969) as reported in Katz & Gallagher, supra note 48, at 6. The
savings in emotional costs through the provision of a permanent home to an otherwise home-
less child cannot be estimated.
51. For instance, because of the peculiarities of Medicaid regulations (with regard to
children requiring special medical or psychological attention) and the reluctance of both
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life into the program and to encourage interstate adoptions, Senator
Cranston recently introduced in the United States Senate a bill that




At least four states opt for some balance between rigid legisla-
tive edicts and open judicial discretion. In so doing they make sub-
stantial strides forward in providing workable guidelines for their
courts and child care agencies.
(a) California
The question whether to terminate parental rights is integral to
the legal analysis of the permanent placement of children outside
the home of their biological parents.53 A termination hearing often
provides the pivotal point in determining the nature and length of
the placement which is legally available to the child. It is thus
central to the problem of continuity of physical and emotional care
for a child in foster care.
California addresses these problems by focusing on the duration
of foster care, the effect on the child of a return to the parents, and
the likelihood of the parents' prospective ability to adequately per-
form parental duties.54 The legislature mandates an order of prefer-
ence for placement determinations: (1) biological parents; (2) cur-
rent caretakers irrespective of family relationships; and finally, (3)
other "suitable" persons." The prevalent requirement of a finding
of parental unfitness has been eliminated in favor of a concentration
on the interests of the child" in placement determinations. Even
foster parents and local welfare departments to move for adoptive placement when the adopt-
ing parents cannot afford traditional adoption, only thirty-five subsidized adoptions have
taken place in Virginia as of May 1, 1977, although the law providing for them has been in
force since 1974. Twenty-five of the children adopted under this plan were placed with their
foster parents. (Based on a personal conversation with Mrs. Neville Weeks, adoption special-
ist, Virginia Department of Welfare, Richmond, Virginia.)
52. S. 961, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. Rac. 3801-07 (March 9, 1977), passed as
amended, id. 17,880 (October 27, 1977).
53. This paper does not focus on removal, voluntary or otherwise, of children from
biological parents. But trying to avoid that issue does not allow us to sidestep completely all
the problems inherent in public intervention in the family. Only the question of initial state
intervention may be escaped entirely. See Wald, supra note 12.
54. CAL. CiV. CODE § 232(7) (West Supp. 1978).
55. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1978).
56. Compare id. with Rocka v. Roanoke County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 215 Va. 515,
518, 211 S.E.2d 76, 78 (1975) (decision mandates that before terminating parental rights the




with statutory guidelines that favor natural parents, the lower
courts apparently endeavor to narrow the vestiges of parental pref-
erence with far greater frequency-at least in reported deci-
sions 5 -than a reading of the statute would lead one to predict.
Some courts ignore the statute altogether,58 while others recognize
its presence but base their decisions on "best interests" principles. 9
Significantly, knee-jerk affirmation of inchoate parental rights can
no longer be expected.
Recently enacted California legislation focuses even more
sharply on the length of time a child is out of the natural parents'
home, 0 because permanent and continuous "parental" relation-
ships are deemed essential to the child. Placements preferred in-
clude (1) adoption, (2) permanent foster care, and (3) guardian-
ship. Though the state requires rehabilitation services for parents
during the initial separation from their children, a premium is
placed on prompt and final adjudication of the children's place-
ment.
(b) Virginia
The Virginia legislature recently revamped its juvenile code,
shifting significantly from its previous notion of supremacy of par-
ental rights. Incorporating the idea that all persons develop close
relationships when they associate with each other for a period of
time, the statute expands the conventional "parent" concept to
include all who stand in that role relative to a child, implying that
the notion of "property" rights of biological parents in their children
is distinctly on the wane.
The new enactment abandons the "best interests" and "welfare
of the child" standards as the criteria for permanent termination of
"residual" parental rights. In their place, the Code sets forth spe-
cific standards to guide judicial discretion. The neglect or abuse
must be a "serious and substantial threat to [the child's] life,
health or development," with no reasonable likelihood of a reforma-
tion of those conditions." The presence of certain specified problems
is deemed prima facie evidence of inability to correct the causes of
57. Professor Mnookin estimated that, during the late 1960's and early 1970's, "about
one in every thousand cases where a California court has ordered foster care placement has
resulted in a reported appellate opinion." Mnookin, supra note 43, at 609.
58. E.g., In re Adoption of Michelle Lee T., 44 Cal. App. 3d 699, 117 Cal. Rptr. 856
(1975).
59. In re Reyna, 55 Cal. App. 3d 288, 126 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1976).
60. S.B. 30 (codified in CAL. WETS. & INST. CODE § 366.5 (West Supp. 1978)) (described
in Mnookin, Foster Care Program, 1 CMLDRN'S IGHTS REPoRT 6, 8-9 (March 1977)).
61. VA. CODE § 16.1-283(B) (Supp. 1978).
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the neglect or abuse. For example, a mental handicap or addiction
to drugs (including alcohol) that interferes with child care duties
and parental failure to use or to "respond" to rehabilitative services
designed to prevent further abuse or neglect creates such a pre-
sumption.2
Here, too, prompt and final determinations are sought. Termi-
nation of parental rights follows parental failure, within twelve
months, to maintain contact with children or to "remedy" the con-
ditions that lead to the placement. 3 The required filing of a foster
care plan" and the periodic review of foster care placements 5 are
designed to eliminate indefinite foster care placements.
Interestingly, the Code avoids complete severance of parent-
child relationships when a child over fourteen years of age objects6
In adding this provision, the legislature evidenced at least some
understanding of the principles that led the Jennings court to termi-
nate parental rights but still allow visitation for the children.
Though strictly limited, this provision exemplifies the legislative
opportunity to allow courts the flexibility to consider the psycholog-
ical needs of children. The obvious remaining question is whether
the courts will accept the opportunities offered them, or whether
they will remain wedded to the restricted alternatives available in
the past.
(c) Minnesota
In 1978 Minnesota joined the growing number of states whose
legislatures are responding to the problem of conflict of rights in a
termination procedure. Minnesota law 7 now requires a case plan for
every child in foster care, either court ordered or voluntary. This
plan must contain (1) reasons for placement, (2) responsibilities of
the social service agency, (3) financial and visitation responsibilities
of the parents, and (4) expected date of return home. The plan must
be signed by the parents, the child placement agency, and if possi-
ble the child, and the plan must be reviewed every six months.
Under the statute parents have the right to counsel in the prep-
aration of the case plan, and they must understand their obligations
under it. As in the other states the notion of providing permanency
for the child is central to the thrust of the statute. If a child is not
62. Id. § 16.1-283(B)(2).
63. Id. § 16.1-283(C).
64. Id. § 16.1-281.
65. Id. § 16.1-282.
66. Id. § 16.1-283(E).
67. 1978 MINN. LAws ch. 602.
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returned home within eighteen months, the agency is required to file
a neglect, dependency, or termination petition.
(d) New York
Because the New York legislature recognizes as paramount the
child's need for continuous emotional support from the adult care-
taker, New York laws are perhaps the most heavily weighted in
favor of the rights of foster parents. 8 Foster parents enjoy preferred
status in adoption proceedings,69 and are deemed interested parties
in proceedings concerning the custody of their foster children.70 So
strong is this emphasis on permanent placement that revocation of
foster placement is allowed if the foster parents fail, within six
months of initial placement, to institute proceedings for adoption. 71
Children in foster care are subject to periodic reviews of their cir-
cumstances, with particular attention paid to the development or
disintegration of their relationship with the biological parents.72
New York succinctly stated its position: long-term, indefinite
foster care placement should be avoided. In its stead New York
places prime importance on recognizing permanent emotional rela-
tionships that develop between children and adults in the foster
home. Disappointingly, the available options are limited to contin-
ued foster care or adoption. For those children for whom either of
these options is not perfectly suited, the legislature has offered no
alternative.
(3) Model Acts
Drafters of two model acts hope to bring uniformity to the
variety of state parental-rights-termination statutes. Each one ad-
dresses to some extent the dilemma of child placement alternatives.
Drafted by a group of juvenile court judges,73 the Model Statute
68. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
69. Id. § 383(3) (McKinney 1976).
70. Id. Whether this section makes foster parents "parties" to an action in the normal
sense, that is, entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard, over whom jurisdiction is
indispensable to any proceeding, is not clear from the statute. Clearly such status is preferred,
since it is quite possible that foster parents are the only "parents" known to a child.
71. Id. § 384-b(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
72. Id. § 392(2), (3), (5-a), (7) (McKinney Supp. 1977). New York's foster care program
underwent a thoughtful analysis by Justice Brennan in Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). Though the failings of long-term, temporary foster care were
deplored, the New York statutes withstood constitutional attack because the procedure avail-
able for questioning foster care placements and removals met the due process standards
outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 431 U.S. at 850-51.
73. Neglected Children Committee, National Council of Juvenile Court Judges, Model
Statute for Termination of Parental Rights, 27 Juv. JUST. 3 (Nov. 1976).
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for Termination of Parental Rights" provides that the court, in de-
termining whether parental rights in children should be ended, may
consider whether the parent failed to stay in contact with his or her
child. The court may consider the length and depth of the relation-
ship existing within the foster family "to the extent that [the foster
child's] identity is with that family. 7 5 The primary weakness of
this proposal is that it provides no middle ground between termina-
tion of parental rights and continued foster care.
An Oregon reform proposal offers a wider range of choices.
7
1
After finding neglect or abandonment-carefully defined in the
act-the court may choose from a variety of dispositional options.
In addition to conditional and unconditional dissolution of the
parent-child relationship, a court may sever parental control with-
out terminating all rights. Such an order awards custody to another
person or agency and "regulate[s] in the manner least detrimental
to the child, the relationship between the child and the parent.
'77
This kind of order, properly attuned to the child's relationships,
supports the integrity of the foster family without severing the bio-
logical parent-child tie.
B. Permanent Placement Without Severance of Contact with
Biological Parents: Case Law Developments
While new developments in the law of child placement proba-
bly occur every day, their impact is limited in that they occur most
often in family courts such as the one that heard the Jennings case:
a court not-of-record, which issues no written opinions, and from
which only a de novo appeal is allowed. Such a decisionmaking
process presents almost insurmountable difficulties in establishing
reliable precedents. First, unless required to present written opin-
ions, courts need not justify or explain admittedly difficult deci-
sions, and they unintentionally may escape a degree of consistency
in decisionmaking.
Second, the nature of the issues also militates against the es-
tablishment of sound legal principles through progressive decisions
74. The model statute bears the unmistakable imprint of the juvenile court judges. The
preamble to the proposed act states that "all orders and judgments of the Juvenile Court shall
be affirmed on appeal unless the trial court committed a gross abuse of discretion, legal error
to the substantial prejudice of the appellant, or the judgment is clearly and manifestly against
the weight of the evidence." Id. at 5.
75. Id.
76. Slader, Robart, & Pike, Suggested Draft, Model Dissolution of Parent-Child Rela-
tionship Act, § XXI (Metropolitan Pub. Defender's Office & Oregon Children's Servs. Div.,




in child care cases. As Professor Mnookin has pointed out, issues of
child custody and child placement involve decisions concerning in-
terpersonal relationships and predictions about the future course of
those relationships:
A determination that is person-oriented and requires predictions necessar-
ily involves an evaluation of the parties who have appeared in court .... The
result of an earlier case involving different people has limited relevance to a
subsequent case requiring individualized evaluations of a particular child and
the litigants. Prior reported cases now provide little basis for controlling or
predicting the outcome of a particular case.18
Perhaps the most instructive trend in the few reported cases is
the movement toward increasingly flexible placements. Even the
historically limited statutory schemes leave room for imaginative
placements consistent with the developmental needs of a child. For
example, an intermediate appellate court in Oregon reached, with-
out the aid of specific statutory directives, a result that provided
some of the benefits of adoption without a complete severance of
contact with the biological parents." Two children, subjected to a
five-year period of custody skirmishes, rebounding placements, and
uncertainty, finally were allowed to remain in the home of non-
parent relatives who had provided the only comparatively constant
relationship throughout the drama. That continuity enabled the
court to override the historically impregnable parental claim to cus-
tody. The parents were allowed to visit.
Two recent English decisions also break traditional barriers to
stepparent adoptions." In both cases the courts found exceptional
circumstances which allowed them to approve adoption and, at the
same time, permit the non-adopting parent to maintain existing
relationships with his child through continued visits. The differing
religious, cultural, and racial heritages of the biological fathers were
sufficient justifications for the courts to break new ground with their
opinions.
In a third situation, involving disputes between parents and
nonrelatives, courts are searching for the proper placement of chil-
dren. In Ross v. Hoffman,81 the court looked for and found
"exceptional circumstances" to justify a finding that a "babysitter"
of eight years, who had provided full time care five days each week,
was the proper custodial "parent." While awarding custody to the
78. Mnookin, supra note 29, at 253.
79. Reflow v. Reflow, 24 Or. App. 365, 545 P.2d 894 (1976).
80. In re S, [19751 1 All E.R. 109 (C.A. 1974); In re J, [1973] 2 All E.R. 410 (Fam.
1973).
81. 33 Md. App. 333, 340, 364 A.2d 596, 601 (Ct. Spec. App. 1976), modified, 280 Md.
172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977).
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"babysitter," the judge found that the child's interests called for
"liberal" visitation by the biological mother.
In Bennett v. Jeffreys,82 in which a mother sought custody of an
eight-year-old daughter whom she had placed in the care of another
woman just after birth, the Court of Appeals of New York defined
the conditions under which it can consider the best interests of the
child with regard to a contest between a parent and a third party:
The State may not deprive a parent of the custody of a child absent surrender,
abandonment, persisting neglect, unfitness or other like extraordinary circum-
stances. If any of such extraordinary circumstances are present, the disposition
of custody is influenced or controlled by what is in the best interest of the child.
In the instant case extraordinary circumstances, namely, the prolonged sepa-
ration of mother and child for most of the child's life, require inquiry into the
best interest of the child.u
On remittitur, the family court awarded custody to the foster
mother and visitation to the biological mother. The Supreme Court
affirmed.84
The concept of continued contact with their children by non-
custodial parents also finds official sanction in states that allow
placement of a child with a guardian, one who has the "rights and
responsibilities of a parent except for the duty to support" the
child.85 Guardianship allows the court to retain for the child a
"familiar environment where the child has his emotional ties" 8 and
does not force the judge to sever ties with the child's original family
when that would be undesirable. Guardianship steers
a course between the finality of a decree of adoption and dismissal of an
adoption petition [when that would benefit the child]. Blood relationships
may coincide with the psychological ties of the child. In such a situation, these
ties are worthy of preservation, just as strong emotional attachments should
not be severed, when they relate to de facto rather than natural parents.87
A California appellate court struck this balance in In re
Guardianship of Marino.88 In that case a child whose mother died
soon after childbirth was raised in the family of his mother's sister
"as if he were their own son. ' 8 After a six year silence, the father
rediscovered an interest in his child and sought custody. Psychiatric
82. 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976).
83. Id. at 543, 356 N.E.2d at 280, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
84. Bennett v. Marrow, 59 A.D.2d 492, 399 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1977).
85. Taylor, Guardianship or "Permanent Placement" of Children, 54 CAuiF. L. REv. 741,
742-43 (1977).
86. Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adoption Law and Proposals for
Legislative Change, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 10, 42 (1975). See also Taylor, supra note 85, at 745.
87. Bodenheimer, supra note 86, at 49 (footnote omitted).
88. 30 Cal. App. 3d 952, 106 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1973).
89. Id. at 954, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 656.
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testimony suggested that Mr. Marino viewed his son Donald largely
as a chattel, 0 and characterized Donald as a boy extraordinarily
dependent upon his caretaker "parents."'" Seeking Donald's contin-
ued healthy emotional development in his only "home," the court
named Donald's caretakers his guardians. Despite the long period
of neglect by the father, however, the court allowed him regular
visitation.
92
In each of these cases, then, a court structured a placement
according to its perception of the emotional needs of the child,93
basing its decision in part on the "exceptional" circumstances pres-
ent in each case. Nevertheless, it was only in "unusual" cases that
these courts felt free to construct placements tailored to the chil-
dren's needs. In the majority of cases courts still feel constrained to
adopt traditional dispositional alternatives. But close analysis of
these decisions shows that in each one a court found it possible
under existing law to fashion a remedy to meet a child's need for a
permanent placement with caring adults and for continued commu-
nication with a non-custodial biological parent. Thus it seems clear
that immediate solutions are possible even in states that have no
prospect of legislative reform.
V. THE NEED FOR FLEXIBLE DISPOSITIONAL ALTERNATIVES
Child custody law still lacks the kind of flexibility that might
better suit the broad variety of issues confronting it. Courts should
more freely utilize individual alternatives molded to fit the myriad
situations in which children find themselves. They need not remain
wedded to wooden legal categories into which children must be
squeezed no matter how uncomfortable the fit. The absoluteness of
termination of parental rights can in some instances be modified to
afford stability to the foster or adoptive family, without necessarily
costing the child continuity with his or her biological family.
Present adoption statutes are being applied in a social climate
90. The father asked the psychiatrist: "If you had an iron that belonged to you wouldn't
you want it back?" Id. at 955, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
91. Id. at 955, 956 & n.1, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 657, 658 & n.1.
92. The only foundation for such an outcome is found in the psychiatric testimony. Id.
See also San Diego County Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 1, 496 P.2d
453, 101 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1972).
93. Other examples of this individualized dispositional pattern arise in related areas:
Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 437, 332 A.2d 199, 204 (1975) (maternal grandparents allowed
to visit a child even after adoption by the father's new spouse, such continued visits being
beneficial to the child). Contra, Browhing v. Tarwater, 215 Kan. 501, 524 P.2d 1135 (1974).
See generally Note, Visitation Rights of a Grandparent Over the Objection of a Parent: The
Best Interests of the Child, 15 J. FAm. L. 51 (1976).
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very different from the one existing when they were enacted. The
first general laws for adoption came into being in this country in the
1850's, 94 a time when there were great numbers of parentless chil-
dren. Until very recently, adoption primarily involved infants sur-
rendered voluntarily by their mothers. Presently, the same legal
construct is expected to meet the needs of older, abused, and neg-
lected children with memories of, and perhaps emotional ties to,
biological parents. When the abused and neglected older child be-
comes a member of a new family by adoption, that family is by no
means indistinguishable from the "natural" family, despite the
implicit legal pronouncement to the contrary.
The absoluteness of the break with biological parents necessi-
tated by termination of parental rights makes it extremely difficult
for courts to make decisions in this area. All too often a judge will
not terminate parental rights, and the child simply remains in foster
care. 5 In the past, the central issue was the biological parent's right
to "ownership" of the child. Society has progressed to the point that
a non-biologically related adult can under certain circumstances
attain "ownership." That absolute break, however, also has impor-
tant emotional consequences, some of which are deleterious to both
children and parents. Loyalty conflicts generated by hostile and
competing adults can be quite crippling for younger children." For
older children, on the other hand, some contact with biological par-
ents may be of value, whether they remain in stable foster care or
are adopted. There is no sound reason to continue in the belief that
adoption requires that biological parents be banished, or that a
child's emotional connections with biological parents preclude the
creation of healthy and stable placements.
Courts now recognize that emotional damage is an inevitable
by-product of the uprooting of a child from his "psychological par-
ents"-regardless of their biological tie to the child-and his place-
ment with a parent figure who has had little or no contact with the
child." Still, judges find it difficult to ignore the pleas of persons
claiming an "interest" in children despite their lack of an emotional
relationship. A sympathetic description of this situation is provided
by Judge Polier in her characterization of the clash which occurs
when an attempt is made to terminate the rights of an adult who,
but for biology, is a stranger to the child:
94. See generally H. WrrmER, E. HERZOG, E. WEINSTEIN, & M. SULLIVAN, INDEPENDENT
ADOPTIONS: A FoLLOW-vp STUDY (1963).
95. Derdeyn, supra note 31.
96. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SoLNrr, supra note 37.
97. See In re Reyna, 55 Cal. App. 3d 288, 301, 126 Cal. Rptr. 138, 147 (1976).
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The parent may never have provided a home, may have maintained no real
contact with the child, and may have no plans for making a home for the child.
Still, the possible termination of parental rights comes as a jolt and is seen as
punishment, forfeiture of what is theirs, and as a threat to self-esteem which
must be fought."
While such parental "interest" should be accorded less importance
than the child's need for adequate parenting, the adult's assertion
of rights in these types of cases is not, by definition, inimical to the
child's welfare." Even when a permanent placement with caring
adults is secured, termination of parental rights followed by adop-
tion is not always preferable to an arrangement allowing knowledge
of or contact with biological parents."'
Some change is already taking place in the law. Foster chil-
dren'01 and their foster parents ' are being accorded standing to sue
or at least to be heard in order to protect their interests. Creative
custodial arrangements are being devised, as in the English cases
coupling adoption with visitation.03 Legislatures, too, are being
asked to expand their placement guidelines. The Oregon Model
Dissolution of Parent-Child Relationship Act allows for the suspen-
sion of those parental rights which are inconsistent with the least
detrimental alternative available to the child. 04 The Oregon Model
Act arguably requires that courts enumerate the rights, interests,
and responsibilities that a parent possesses in and for his or her
child. Such an enumeration will not be an easy process. Some ele-
ments that might be considered either in adoption or permanent
foster care are (1) the right to be kept informed about one's child's
progress; (2) an expectation of visitation, but only at the child's (or
the court's or the guardian's) option; (3) a limited or conditional
right of visitation vested in the parent; (4) a duty to contribute
support; and (5) a right to limited or conditional custody. In consid-
ering individual cases courts can determine which components of
the parent-child relationship should be preserved.
98. In re P., 71 Misc. 2d 965, 966, 337 N.Y.S.2d 203, 205 (Fain. Ct. 1972). See also H.
CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 17.5 (1968); Derdeyn, Child Custody Consultation,
45 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 791, 793 (1975).
99. Derdeyn, Child Abuse and Neglect: The Rights of Parents and the Needs of Their
Children, 47 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 377, 384-85 (1977).
100. Derdeyn, supra note 31.
101. Organization of Foster Families v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816
(1977).
102. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 547 F.2d 835,
854 (5th Cir.), rev'd on rehearing en banc, 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977); Reflow v. Reflow,
24 Or. App. 365, 545 P.2d 894 (1976).
103. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
104. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
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Provisions must be made to insure that judges render written
opinions and that all interested parties are given the opportunity to
participate in the proceedings. In addition to biological parents,
foster parents and children also are proper parties to termination
and custodial adjustment proceedings.105 After this proceeding, the
court should be required to make written findings of fact and con-
clusions of law. An explanation of the course chosen helps insure a
reasoned decision by a judge who must, for the record, consider the
various alternatives that he or she ultimately rejects. It also makes
an appellate court's task of review easier. 0
Courts not infrequently face a situation wherein children
placed long ago in foster care still feel or need an attachment to their
parents. The current adoption practice of severing any and all
connections with the biological parents may be extremely unsettling
to these children, as it would have been to the Jennings children.
Even when children are assured of a permanent home with their
foster parents, either through permanent foster care or adoption,
contact with their biological parents encourages a sense of continu-
ity of self and the development of realistic attitudes'0 toward their
biological parents and themselves. In such cases, the children
should have a right to visit, a right vested in the child and under
the control of the adoptive or permanent foster parents. Virginia did
not have a provision for permanent foster care at the time of the
Jennings trial,'0 but the Jennings court constructed an approxima-
tion of permanent foster care by terminating rights of the Jennings
parents, continuing the placement of Julie and Tom Jennings in the
Wallace home, and defining the children's right to visit their biolog-
ical parents.
Most decisions cite "exceptional circumstances" to justify their
creativity, flexibility, or deviance from traditional parental rights
and standard custodial alternatives. The situation of the Jennings
children, however, is by no means a unique one for children in foster
care: for many there continues to be a memory of and an attachment
105. See Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 547 F.2d
835 (5th Cir.), rev'd on rehearing en banc, 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977); Organization of
Foster Families v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Katzoff v. Superior
Court, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1079, 127 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1976).
106. Mnookin, supra note 29, at 279; Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems
of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRAcusz L. Rav. 55, 74 (1969). An example of sloppy oral
decisionmaking is apparent in In re Guardianship of Marino, 30 Cal. App. 3d 952, 960, 106
Cal. Rptr. 655, 660-61 (Ct. App. 1973).
107. Wald, supra note 12, at 672.
108. Subsequent to the Jennings trial, Virginia's revision of the juvenile code included
a provision for permanent foster care. VA. CODE § 63.1-206.1 (Supp. 1978).
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to biological parents who are extremely unlikely ever to be able to
care for them. These alternatives-the permanent care of a child by
non-biological parents and a child's continuing relationship with
biological parents-need not be mutually exclusive, and need not
continue to present such a block to making dispositions in accord-
ance with children's historical and emotional realities. It is possible
to construct dispositions that afford the child the needed stability
of a continuous placement and still avoid severing the child's
connections with his or her past.
